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Abstract
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when
voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from
small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the
choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the
relative e¢ ciency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled
laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but
there are signicant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the
sequential and simultaneous voting games. We nd a tradeo¤ between information aggregation,
e¢ ciency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information
better than simultaneous voting and is more e¢ cient in some information environments, but
sequential voting is inequitable because early voters pay greater participation costs.
On November 7, 2000 the polls closed in the eastern time zone portion of Florida at
7:00 p.m. At 7:49:40 p.m., while Florida voters in central time zone counties were still voting,
NBC/MSNBC projected that the state was in Al Gores column. A few seconds later CBS
and FOX also declared the state for Gore and ten minutes later ABC projected Florida for
Gore, three hours before the polls closed in California [Shepard (2001)].
Most of the concerns raised after these early election calls were about the problems of
inaccuracy [Thompson (2004) is a notable exception]. However, even accurate reports of early
voting outcomes during an election may mean that the election is fundamentally di¤erent from
one held where voters participate simultaneously in at least three ways. First, when voters
participate sequentially and early results are revealed to later voters, the choices facing the
voters are complex as later voters use early voting as a noisy information source and early
voters try to anticipate the message their votes can send to later voters and how later voters
will react to that message. These choices are even more complicated if voting is a costly act,
requiring an investment of time and resources, such that some voters may choose to abstain.
Second, if votersbehavior does depend on the voting mechanism, then we might expect that
sequential and simultaneous voting mechanisms will di¤er in e¢ ciency. Simultaneous voting
can be more informationally e¢ cient than sequential voting if in sequential voting later voters
are less inclined to participate or vote to follow the crowdrather than their independent
judgements. On the other hand, sequential voting might be more economically e¢ cient when
voting is costly if the outcome of the voting is equivalent but less voters are required to
participate to achieve that outcome. Finally, sequential voting can be inequitable if voters
abstention decisions depend on when they vote and thus the costs of participation are borne
unequally by early and late voters. In this paper we address these three concerns about
sequential votingstrategic behavior, e¢ ciency, and participation equityboth theoretically and
experimentally.
Election reporting of early voterschoices during national elections in the U.S. is just
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one example of the many voting situations in which participants choose in a sequential order
and individual choices are publicly revealed as they are made. The term roll call voterefers
to the mechanism of calling for individualsvotes as their names are called as listed on a roll
and is used in many voting contexts from city council meetings to national legislatures.
Voting order is frequently debated in such bodies and in some cases manipulated in order to
a¤ect the outcome or to advantage particular members by changing their voting positions.
Another type of controversial sequential voting occurs in U.S. presidential primaries, where
voters participate by state and the outcome is the result of the cumulative choices. As
discussed in Morton and Williams (2000) many believe that the sequential nature of the
primaries gives voters in early states like New Hampshire and Iowa an undue inuence on the
outcome through their inuence on later voterschoices. A similar voting mechanism is used
when countries hold sequential referenda over treaties or agreements as in the recent referenda
over the proposed European Union Constitution. The order in which countries vote is often
argued to have an e¤ect on the voting in countries who choose later in the sequence and
attempts are made to manipulate that order. Even more signicantly, a growing percentage of
voters are choosing before election day either by mail or in early voting locations. In Oregon
all elections are conducted by mail over a period of weeks. Over 22 percent of the respondents
to the National Election Studies post 2004 survey reported voting before election day, with
over 73 percent of the early voters reporting voting more than a week before election day.
Although the information about how early voters choose is assumed to be secret, polls and
other surveys are used to estimate these choices making it possible for later voters (or those
who mobilize them) to know how early voters chose prior to making their own choices.
Empirical research on the e¤ect of sequential voting on voter behavior, both
experimental and nonexperimental, is surprisingly sparse. Two experimental studies consider
sequential voting without abstention: Hung and Plott (2001) and Morton and Williams (1999,
2000). These two studies provide somewhat conicting conclusions about the extent later
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voters use early voterschoices to inform their decisions. Hung and Plott investigate
sequential voting with a particular concern for the follow the crowdbehavior. When they
included a treatment which induced preference for conformity with monetary incentives, they
observe such behavior. Morton and Williams nd that in sequential voting later voters do
sometimes use the information they infer from earlier voting and that these later voters make
more informed choices than in simultaneous voting, supporting concerns about the unfairness
of sequential voting.
Although roll call voting in Congress and other legislatures has been extensively
studied, we are aware of no studies of such voting that explicitly considers how sequence a¤ects
membersdecisions. The only nonexperimental empirical research on sequential voting of
which we are aware has focused on the e¤ect of early election calls such as in 2000 on later
voter turnout [see for example Jacksons (1983) study of the 1980 election]. Frankovic (2001)
reviews the literature, including several unpublished studies of the 2000 election. Despite the
fact that some of the analyses, like Jacksons, nd an e¤ect, as Frankovic notes the studies
either use surveys of voters after the election where a number clearly have faulty memories
(some respondents claim to have heard network calls earlier than they were actually made) or
the studies use aggregate data on past elections to estimate voter preferences in the election
studied to infer an e¤ect on voter behavior. She points out rightly the di¢ culty from drawing
conclusions based on the available data. She concludes that there is little evidence of any
impact of calling an election before all the polls are closed. Yet she notes that paradoxically,
there is no doubt that the public perceives this to be a serious problem. While the
arguments claiming an e¤ect often are politically motivated, and the research does not support
the claim, the public believes otherwise. Is the American public crazy as Frankovic suggests?
Or does knowing the results of early voting a¤ect later voterschoices?
3
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We consider a game with an odd number, n, of voters who decide by plurality rule. There are
two alternatives A,B and two states of the world: in the rst state A is optimal and in the
second state B is optimal. Without loss of generality, we label A the rst state and B the
second. The voters have identical preferences represented by a utility function u(x; ) that
depends on the state  and the action x: v(A;A) = v(B;B) = v and v(A;B) = v(B;A) = 0,
where v > 0. State A has a prior probability  = 12 . The true state of the world is unknown,
but each voter receives an informative signal. We assume that signals of di¤erent agents are
conditionally independent and all have the same precision. The signal can take two values a; b
with probability: Pr(ajA) = p = Pr(bjB), where p > 12 .
Although we assume that voters have identical preferences and thus if fully informed
would agree on a common choice, we can think of the voters as having di¤erent preferences
over policy goals as given by their signals, but at the same time having common ultimate goals
as in other models of elections such as Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001). Battaglini
(2005) shows that the distinctions we nd between sequential and simultaneous voting also
exist when voters have private values.
Costly Voting and Why the Order of Voting Matters
There is a natural reason why behavior should depend on the order of the voting procedure:
when voters can observe previous votersbehavior, they can be inuenced by previous choices
which may signal private information. In a recent contribution, however, Deckel and Piccione
[2000] have questioned this reasoning. They show that, under general conditions, any
symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting game in which players use their information
is in fact a sequential equilibrium in any sequential voting game and that there always exists
equilibrium behavior in the simultaneous game that is completely independent of the order of
voting.
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Their argument is based on the observation that a rational voter would realize that he
is inuential only when pivotal. To see the intuition, assume that voters ignore the sequential
order of the voting protocol and behave as if they were in an equilibrium of a simultaneous
voting game. In this case, the expected benet of voting for alternative A for a voter i who
votes at stage t after a history ht and an observed signal si = a can be represented as:
U(si) = Pr(PIVi jht; si = a)  v 

Pr (A jPIVi; si = a)  1
2

(1)
where Pr(PIVi;ht; si) is the probability of being pivotal; and v  Pr (A jPIVi; si ) is the
expected utility obtained if A wins conditional on being pivotal and on a signal si.1 The
probability of being pivotal depends on the signal si observed by i and on the particular
history of votes cast in the previous stages of the game, but the expected utility is independent
of ht: in the pivotal event, the agent knowshow all the others have voted, not only those
who choose in the previous stages. The voter decides how to vote on the basis of (1): he votes
A when it is positive, and votes B when negative. Since Pr(PIVi jht; si = a)v is non negative,
his choice will be determined by the sign of

Pr (A jPIVi; si = a)  12

: which implies that he
nds it optimal to make a choice that is independent of the history. An informational cascade
will not occur.
Dekel and Piccione (2000)s result does not imply that the set of symmetric informative
equilibria of the simultaneous and sequential voting games are identical, only that the rst is a
subset of the second. This result leaves open the possibility that the sequential voting game
has additional equilibria that are not in the equilibrium set of the simultaneous game.2 The
importance of Dekel and Piccione lies in the fact that it undermines the ability to conduct
meaningful welfare comparisons between alternative voting mechanisms. Is there a reason why
we should expect that equilibrium behavior is necessarily di¤erent in simultaneous and
sequential mechanisms?3
An attempt to solve this indeterminacy is provided in Battaglini (2005), by introducing
voting costs. When there is a cost of voting c and the agent can abstain, the decision depends
5
on the sign of:
Pr(PIVi jht; si = a)

v  Pr (A jPIVi; si = a)  1
2

  c
In this case the decision is determined by the magnitude of Pr(PIVi jht; si ), which depends on
ht. We should therefore expect to see rates of abstention that depend on the history, and that
increase as the probability of being pivotal decreases. This strategic abstention phenomenon
also suggests that the set of equilibria and the informational properties of the two elections will
also di¤er: the set of equilibria are disjoint and simultaneous voting should be superior when
the size of the election is large enough.4
In an election this cost straightforwardly represents the cost of the physical time and
e¤ort of voting and can also be interpreted as the cost of mobilizing a group of voters to
participate. In a legislative situation the cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of
engaging in other legislative activitiesthe cost of leaving a meeting of a committee,
constituents, or executive o¢ cials to cast a ballot in a roll call vote or even the risk of taking
an unpopular stand on an issue. Legislators are often aware of the progress of voting on
contested matters while engaging in other activities and can and do choose whether to return
to the chamber. The cost could also be interpreted as a cost of position taking if we assume
that these costs are independent of the position taken or the outcome of the voting; that is
legislators may see it as desirable to not take any positions on issues. A number of researchers
have found evidence that members of Congress, both House and Senate, avoid voting either
because of the demands of campaigning or a desire to not to take a policy position [see
Thomas (1991), Rothenberg and Sanders (1999, 2000), and Jones (2003)].5 News accounts
complaining of excessive abstention in city councils and other legislative bodies and mandatory
rules requiring that members only abstain if they have a conict of interest also suggests that
these members see the act of voting itself as costly.
With costly voting, the net utility function of a voter who votes is therefore u(x; )  c:
in state  if option x is chosen. We assume that a voter who decides alone would always prefer
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to pay the cost and determine the outcome of the election: so c < 12 (2p  1) v, where
1
2 (2p  1) v is the expected utility of voting for A (B) conditional on a a (b) signal. It is
therefore convenient to re-parametrize the cost as c = 2 (2p  1), where  2 (0; 1).
The Voting Games
We will consider two game forms, which we call the simultaneous voting game and the
sequential voting game. In both games the outcome is chosen by majority rule and we assume
that when A receives the same votes as B, or when all voters abstain, then one of the two
alternatives is chosen with probability 1=2. In what follows we assume n = 3. In the
simultaneous voting game all voters vote simultaneously. In this case, a (pure) voting strategy
for voter i is a map vi : fa; bg ! fA;B; g: i.e., given the signal, the voter may vote for A, B
or abstain. A mixed strategy assigns a probability of abstaining i(; si), and, conditional on
voting a probability of voting for each alternative, i(x; si), x = A;B. In the second game
form voters vote sequentially. In this case, a strategy is a function vi : Hi  fa; bg ! [A;B; ]
where Hi is the set of histories that voter i can observe. In this case too we will denote
i(; si; hi) the probability that voter i abstains after observing a signal si and a history hi;
and i(x; si; hi) the respective probability of voting for x, conditional on not abstaining.
An equilibrium of the sequential game (resp. simultaneous game) is symmetric if
i(; s; ht) = j(; s; ht) for all i,j and all ht 2 Ht, and  2 fa; b; /g, s 2 fa; bg (resp. if
i(; s) = j(; s) for all i,j and for  2 fa; b; /g, s 2 fa; bg). In this symmetric environment
there is no a priori di¤erence between state A and B: it is therefore natural to assume that the
names associated with these two states are irrelevant for the strategic considerations of the
agents. Let us dene Na(ht) (Nb(ht)) the number of a (b) votes in a history ht; and let
H0t = fht s.t. Na(ht) = Nb(ht)g. After any of these histories the states continue to be
symmetric. We dene an equilibrium of the sequential game (resp. simultaneous game) to be
neutral if two requirements are satised: i) i(; a; ht) = i(; b; ht) for any ht 2 H0t (resp.
i(; a) = i(; b)); and ii) Pr ( jht ) = Pr ( jht+1 ) for any ht 2 H0t , ht+1 = fht; g, and
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 = A;B.6 Neutrality, therefore requires that if there is no reason imposed by how previous
voters have voted to treat the alternatives in a asymmetric way, then their names should be
irrelevant for the decision to vote or abstain. In our experiments we nd that no signicant
relationship between voterschoices and the labels of the alternatives.7 In the rest of the
analysis we focus on symmetric, neutral perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies; for simplicity we will refer to such an equilibrium as an equilibrium.
Equilibrium Characterization
The characterization of equilibria in the simultaneous game is simplied by two observations.
First, because we focus on equilibria that are neutral and symmetric and  = 0:5, voters never
vote against their signal; they either vote sincerely or abstain. Therefore, to characterize the
equilibrium we only need to determine the abstention probabilities, fi(; si)g3i=1. Second,
neutrality implies that i(; a) = i(; b) = i(), and symmetry implies i() = j() = ()
for all i,j. Therefore we can focus on one variable only: (), and we drop the dependence on
, simply writing it as .
The equilibrium value of  is determined by the cost of voting c and the equilibrium
expected benet of voting, which is balanced against the expected utility of not voting, so the
usual cost benet calculus applies by conditioning on pivotal events. Consider voter i with a
signal si = a. His vote is pivotal only in three events. First, when no other voter participates,
event P0. This event occurs with probability 2; and, in this event, the expected benet of
voting for A is equal to pv and the expected benet of not voting is simply 12 . Hence the
expected gain from voting in event P0 equals 12 (2p  1) v, where p is the posterior probability
of state A after one signal a. Second, a voter is pivotal when exactly one other player votes,
and this player voters B, event P1: In this case, however, the posterior is 12 because in P1 there
are exactly two opposite signal which o¤set on the other, so the expected gain from voting is 0.
The third possibility, is when the two other voters vote, and they vote for opposite
alternatives, event P2. In this case, voter i knows that there are two a signals and one b signal.
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The posterior is Pr (A ja; P2 ) =
1
2
p2(1 p)
1
2
p2(1 p)+ 1
2
p(1 p)2 = p, and the expected benet of voting is,
again, 12 (2p  1) v. From the point of view of i, this event occurs with probability:
Pr (P2 ja) = 2 (1  )2 p(1  p). The expected utility of voting for A for agent i is therefore:
u(vote A ja)  EU () = 1
2
(2p  1) v
h
2 + 2 (1  )2 p(1  p)
i
(2)
Comparing with the cost of voting we have a pure strategy equilibrium in which all agents vote
when EU(0) = (2p  1)p(1  p)v > c; and we have a mixed equilibrium at any value of  2
(0; 1) such that EU () = c. Using these conditions we can characterize the set of symmetric
equilibria in the simultaneous game.
Proposition 1 In the simultaneous voting game, when n = 3:
i. If c 2
h
0; p(1 p)(2p 1)1+2p(1 p) v

there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium  = 0.
ii. If c 2
h
p(1 p)(2p 1)
1+2p(1 p) v; p(1  p)(2p  1)v
i
there are three equilibria: one pure strategy
equilibrium  = 0; and two mixed strategy equilibria.
iii. If c 2  p(1  p)(2p  1)v; 12(2p  1)v, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium
 2 (0; 1)
In a sequential game the action of an agent a¤ects the outcome in two ways. First, we
have a direct e¤ect: given the vote of the others, a vote in favor of an option increases its
plurality. But the vote of early voters has an indirect inuence on later voters as well: the
vote signals the voters information to the remaining voters. This allows information to be
leaked in a way that is not possible with simultaneous voting, and this leakage may lead to
e¢ ciency gains since later voters will rationally (and e¢ ciently) abstain after some sequences
of decisions by earlier voters. We focus on sincere equilibria in which no voter votes against
his own signals. While there can exist equilibria where early voters vote against their signals,
they are intuitively implausible, ine¢ cient, and not observed in our experiments.8 At least one
sincere equilibrium always exists, and it is unique in the three-voter case we are considering
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here. The following proposition summarizes the unique path of equilibrium play as a function
of the voting cost, and informativeness of the signal.9
Proposition 2 In the sequential voting game, when n = 3 there exists a unique sincere,
neutral equilibrium path, for all voting costs, and this equilibrium is in pure strategies. The
equilibrium path is as follows:
i. If c 2 [0; p(1  p)2p  1)v], the rst voter votes (sincerely), the second voter votes only if
the rst voter has voted and he has a di¤erent signal than the rst voter; and the last
voter only if the rst and second voters vote for opposite alternatives or if no voter votes
before. All voters vote informatively when they vote;
ii. If c 2 p(1  p)(2p  1)v; 12(2p  1)v, the rst and second voters abstain and the third
voter votes (sincerely).
Theoretical Implications for E¢ ciency and Equity
Propositions 1 and 2 present a clear characterization of the equilibria. When
c < p(1 p)(2p 1)v1+2p(1 p) and c > p(1  p)(2p  1)v, we have a unique equilibrium in both the
simultaneous and in the sequential models, and these equilibria are di¤erent. In particular:
 When c < p(1 p)(2p 1)v1+2p(1 p) there is a unique equilibrium of the simultaneous game in which
the voters vote informatively and never abstain. In the sequential game there is a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies as described in point i. of Proposition 2.
 When c > p(1  p)(2p  1)v there is a unique equilibrium of the simultaneous game in
which the voters abstain with probability EU 1(c) 2 (0; 1) and vote informatively with
the complementary probability. In the sequential game there is a unique equilibrium in
pure strategies in which only the last voter votes in equilibrium, as described in point ii:
of Proposition 2.
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In the rest of the paper we focus on parameters only in these two regions to avoid
multiplicity of equilibria. We refer to the rst case as the low cost case and to the second case
as the high cost case. Given this, we should expect very di¤erent behavior between
simultaneous and sequential elections, and given the voting mechanism between low and high
costs. In particular:
 In simultaneous elections, we should expect the probability of abstention to be
decreasing in the cost of voting: the probability should be zero in the low cost region and
positive in the high cost region.
 In sequential elections with low costs the rst voter should always vote and late voters
should vote only if they nd it optimal to correct the choice of earlier voters and if they
are pivotal. In sequential elections with high costs the opposite should occurthey should
be characterized by free riding from early voters who should abstain counting on the
participation of late votes.
These di¤erences have an impact on the theoretical e¢ ciency and equity properties of
the voting mechanisms as well as noted above. With respect to equity, in a symmetric
equilibrium under simultaneous voting all voters obtain the same expected utility, in the
sequential mechanism expected utility depends on the stage in which the agent votes. When
the cost is low and the later voters free ride, early voters receive a lower utility level than later
voters; in a high cost regime, on the contrary, early voters free ride on the participation of
later voters and obtain higher expected utility. The predictions with respect to e¢ ciency will
be discussed in greater details below where we develop the appropriate benchmark case for
e¢ ciency: here we note that when the cost is low we should expect lower abstention than with
high voting costs: and, therefore, we should expect a more e¢ cient collective choice when the
cost of voting is low.
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiments were conducted at a major research university and used students from that
university. All the laboratory experiments used p = 0:75 and v = 40 cents. We used two
di¤erent treatments for the cost of voting: c = 8 cents and c = 2 cents. These parameters
were selected such that under each voting mechanism there are unique equilibrium predictions
and thus we have distinctive predictions about voter behavior, e¢ ciency, and equity. Six
sessions were conducted, each with either 9 or 12 subjects.10 Each subject participated in
exactly one session. Each session was divided into two half-sessions with di¤erent treatments,
each of which lasted for 20 rounds for a total of 40 rounds per session. Table 1 summarizes the
session predictions according to the cost parameters.
[Table 1 here]
Subjects were randomly divided into groups of three for each round and in the
sequential voting treatments were randomly assigned voting positions (rst, second, or third
voter) within each new group. Instructions were read aloud and subjects were required to
correctly answer all questions on a short comprehension quiz before the experiment was
conducted. Subjects were also provided a summary sheet about the experiment which they
could consult. The experiments were conducted via computers.11 Subjects were told there
were two possible jars, Jar 1 and Jar 2. Jar 1 contained six red balls and two blue; jar 2
contained six blue balls and two red. For each group, one of the jars was randomly selected by
the computer, with replacement. The balls were then shu­ ed in random order on each
subjects computer screen, with the ball colors hidden. Each subject then privately selected
one ball by clicking on it with her mouse and thereby revealing its color to that subject only.
The subject then chose whether to vote for Jar 1, Jar 2, or abstain. If the majority of the
votes cast by a group were for the correct jar, each group member, regardless of whether she
voted, received a payo¤ of 50 cents (minus the cost of voting if she voted). If the majority of
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the votes cast by a group were incorrect guesses, each group member, regardless of whether she
voted received a payo¤ of 10 cents (minus the cost of voting if she voted). Ties were broken
randomly. This was repeated in the next round, with group membership shu­ ed randomly
between each round. Each subject was paid the sum of her earnings over all rounds in cash at
the end of the session. Average earnings were approximately $25, with each session lasting
about 90 minutes.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Individual Choices: Does Sequence Matter?
Simultaneous Voting Choices
Our theoretical analysis of simultaneous voting suggests that we should see zero abstention in
the low cost treatment and positive abstention in the high cost treatment. Table 2
summarizes the voting choices of participants in the simultaneous voting games. Of the 900
individual voting decisions in the simultaneous voting games, only 17 (<2%) were votes
against a subjects signal and of these 11 were cast by two subjects in the low cost treatment.
Abstention was signicantly higher in the high cost treatment than in the low cost games
(67.86 percent compared to 38.96 percent). As is clear from Table 2, we nd little support for
the exact quantitative Nash equilibrium predictions in simultaneous voting: low cost voters
abstain signicantly more than predicted, and high cost voters abstain signicantly less than
predicted.12 However the Nash solution assumes voters behave perfectly rationally with no
error. Given the complexity of the game they are playing, such a strong assumption seems
implausible.
[Table 2 here]
An alternative approach, following McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998), is to consider a
statistical version of Nash equilibrium where, for each actor, all possible actions have a positive
probability with the probabilities ordered by the expected payo¤s of the actions. The
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specication of these probabilities uses a quantal response function, which is a statistical
version of a best response function. Of course, these quantalresponses will also be
inuenced by the probability distribution chosen by the other players in the game and so on.
A QRE is the xed point of this iterative process, just as Nash equilibrium is a xed point of
the best response iteration. To simplify computations, we consider QRE of only the simplied
version of the simultaneous voting game in which players choose either to vote sincerely or to
abstain. The conclusions are unchanged if we use a QRE model where subjects vote against
their signal with some probability. In order to provide parametric estimates in our analysis, we
use the logit specication of QRE, where the quantal response functions are logit curves and 
is the response parameter. When  = 0, the response curves are at and all strategies are
used with equal probability, or zero rationality. As  approaches 1, the logit response curves
converge to the best response curves, or perfect rationality. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
predictions correspond to a boundary case of the QRE model.
Our estimates of the QRE for the simultaneous voting games are given in Table 2. We
estimated three values of , one where  is constrained to be equal across cost treatments
(corresponding predicted abstention rates are given in columns 5 and 9) and two unconstrained
values of  by cost treatment, H and L for high and low cost treatments respectively. For
all rounds, using a likelihood ratio test, the di¤erence between H and L is not signicant at
the 5% level (the 2 equals 2.9). This nding suggests that a unique parameter can explain
behavior of the subjects in the simultaneous game, even though the Nash equilibria are
extremely di¤erent in the high and low cost treatments. We nd little change in the values of
H and L over time, except for some apparent convergence towards each other (and to the
constrained value). For the last ten rounds we nd the di¤erence not signicant at any
conventional level (the 2 equals 1.2).
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the probability of abstaining and the
equilibrium values of  for both the low and high cost treatments along with the estimated
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values for our treatments. The two curves show the equilibrium abstention rates for each cost
treatment associated with given values of . For  = 0, the QRE predicted abstention rates
for both low and high cost treatments is equal 0.5. As  increases, the equilibritum abstention
rate in the low cost treatment approaches zero, while the equilibrium abstention rate in the
high cost treatment approaches the Nash equilibrium prediction of 0.89. The vertical lines
denote the values of  for both the constrained and unconstrained estimations and the small
circles the observed abstention rates in the treatments.
[Figure 1 here]
Sequential Voting Choices
In the sequential voting games theory implies two types of strategic abstention: In the low
cost treatment, the equilibrium predicts that later voters will strategically abstain when they
are not pivotal, voting sincerely otherwise and in the high cost treatment, the equilibrium
predicts that early voters will strategically abstain, leaving the choice for later voters. If early
voters do vote, later voters will choose sincerely if pivotal, otherwise they will strategically
abstain. Table 3 summarizes the aggregate abstention rates at all information sets as well as
our predictions for both equilibrium and o¤ the path behavior. We pool observations for voters
with a and b signals. In the history column, Sindicates that a previous voter voted for the
alternative consistent with the current voters signal (that is, the same as the current voters
signal), and Dindicates that a previous voter voted for the alternative inconsistent with the
current voters signal (that is, di¤erent from the current voters signal). Arepresents
abstention by a previous voter. For the histories facing the third voter, the rst character
refers to the voting choice of the rst voter with respect to the third voters signal and the
second character refers to the voting choice of the second voter with respect to the third
voters signal. Out of 1860 voting decisions, we observed only 27 (<1.5%) cases where voters
voted against their signal, and these were scattered randomly across the information sets. We
discuss the results of the table in the reverse order of voting.
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[Table 3 here]
Third VotersChoices As with simultaneous voters, only 4 out of 620 (0.6%) voting
choices were contrary to third voterssignals. Thus we nd essentially no evidence of follow
the crowdbehavior or information cascades, even when third voters are not pivotal. Rational
third voters will strategically abstain if their votes are not pivotal. Third voters are
signicantly more likely to abstain when it is clear that their vote is irrelevant in both the high
and low cost treatmentsin 270 of the 283 cases (95.4%) where voting their signal would not
have altered the outcome third voters abstained. Theory performs less well in predicting voter
choices in situations where their votes are pivotal and we would expect third voters to vote.
That is, when both voters 1 and 2 abstain, third voters vote only in 75 out of 111 cases
(67.57%) and when voters 1 and 2 votes conict, third voters vote only in 22 of 67 cases
(32.84%).
Second VotersChoices The Nash equilibrium makes the following predictions about
second voter behavior: In both the low and high cost treatments, we predict second voters to
strategically abstain if rst voters voted their signals or if rst voters abstained, and to vote
sincerely if rst voters voted contrary to their signals. The decisions of the second voter are
displayed in Table 3, broken down by the decision of the rst voter and the signal of the
second voter. As above, we nd few voters voting contrary to their own signals, ten out of 620
voting choices (1.6%). In the low cost treatment, second voters abstain signicantly more
than simultaneous voters [t statistic of 3.94] and rst voters [t statistic = 5.04]. In the high
cost treatment, there is no signicant di¤erence between simultaneous votersabstention
choices and second voters[t statistic = 0.73], but second voters do abstain signicantly more
than rst voters [t statistic = 5.27]. These results reect the fact that we nd strong evidence
of strategic abstention when rst voters vote second voters signals. When rst voters abstain,
however, second voters in the low cost treatment are more likely to vote than abstain while
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second voters in the high cost treatment are equally likelly to vote or abstain. When rst
voters vote contrary to the second voters signal, low cost voters are more likely to vote than
abstain, while high cost voters are more likely to abstain than vote.
First VotersChoices The Nash equilibrium predicts that rst voters will choose sincerely
in the low cost treatment and abstain in the high cost treatment. As above, few rst voters
voted contrary to their signal, only 13 out of 620 voting choices (2.1%). Also as with the
voters in the simultaneous voting games, rst voters abstained signicantly more in the high
cost treatment than in the low cost treatment [t statistic = 2.99]. However rst voters in the
sequential voting games are signicantly less likely to abstain than voters in the simultaneous
game with the same cost treatment, and this di¤erence is highly signicant in the high cost
treatment [low cost t statistic = 1.6 and high cost t statistic = 6.35]. Thus, while cost
increases abstention, as predicted, rst voters in the high cost treatment abstain far less than
theoretically predicted. Suprisingly few rst voters strategically abstain in the high cost
sessions (that is, pass the choice on to later voters).
QRE Estimation As with the simultaneous voting game, we estimate the QRE for the
simplied sequential voting game (where voters either vote their signals or abstain); the results
from that estimation is also presented in Table 3. We did not estimate the QRE model where
voters could vote against their signal, due to computational limitations. As in the QRE
estimation of the simultaneous game, the assumption is that voters use a logit response
function and we solve for the QRE xed point of the sequential game. As above,  is our
measure of voter responsiveness, where higher values of  corresponding to behavior that is
more consistent with perfect best responses. We report the estimate where  is constrained to
be the same for both low and high cost sessions as in the simultaneous voting game analysis,
and also report the separate estimates. Figures 2a,b,c display the logit equilibrium
correspondences for the sequential game for both low and high cost treatments with
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unconstrained values of .13 Figure 2a displays the correspondences for the rst voter, Figure
2b for the second voter, and Figure 2c for the fhird voter. Note that in Figures 2b,c the
equilibrium correspondences depend on the voters information set with the histories dened as
in Table 3 described above.
[Figures 2a,b,c here]
As in the simultaneous voting analysis, we nd a lack of signicant di¤erence between
H and L, and an apparent convergence over time. For all rounds the likelihood ratio test
the 2 statistic equals 4.88 which is barely signicant, but for the last ten rounds the 2
statistic is less than 0.01. As with the simultaneous game, this fact suggests that a single
value of the QRE parameter, , can explain behavior in quite di¤erent strategic environments.
That is, just one parameter explains behavior at di¤erent nodes of the game in which subjects
are in di¤erent stages of voting and information sets.
We also estimated a constrained value of  for all the data (simultaneous and
sequential, low and high cost). Because we had more observations of sequential voting for a
greater number of information sets, the resulting  was almost identical to the constrained 
for the sequential voting games, that is 0.155. A likelihood ratio test shows that the estimates
for the sequential and simultaneous games are signicantly di¤erent. This is not surprising,
since the simultaneous and sequential game forms are completely di¤erent. The sequential
game form has many di¤erent information sets and is a signaling game, which requires players
to make subtle inferences from earlier players choices. This has been observed elsewhere, even
when comparing two simultaneous-move games.14
Besides providing a much better quantitative t to the data than the Nash equilibrium,
the QRE model also makes a number of successful qualitative predictions about treatment
e¤ects, where Nash equilibrium predicts no e¤ect at all. For the second and third voters, for
any value of , the QRE abstention probabilities are higher in the high cost treatment than
the low cost treatment.
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Furthermore, Nash equilibrium predicts no e¤ect at any history for the second and
third voters while QRE predicts such e¤ects, indpendent of the value of . This is borne out in
the data too, for the most part. For all three histories, the second voter abstains more often in
the high cost treatment (t statistic = 3.05). In fact, for the high cost treatment, after a
contradictory vote by the rst voter, the second voter chooses to abstain more often than
voting, which is consistent with QRE, but grossly inconsistent with the Nash prediction of
always voting. The reason is that, given the actual behavior by the third voter, the second
voter is actually better o¤ abstaining than voting in that history (contrary to Nash
equilibrium). For the third voter, the positive cost e¤ect on abstention conditional on history
is generally not signicant, but goes in the direction predicted by QRE in in 5 out of 9
histories. These directional predictions are independent of :
As the analysis above shows we can conclude the following about strategic abstention:
1. We nd weak evidence of strategic abstention by early voters. First voters do abstain more
under the high cost treatment, passing the choice on to later voters, but abstain less than
simultaneous voters facing the same cost. First voters respond signicantly to expected utility
gains from voting.
2. We nd strong evidence of strategic abstention by later (third) voters when they are not
pivotal and second voters passingon voting when rst voterschoices agree with their
signals.
EFFICIENCY OF THE VOTING MECHANISMS
Informational E¢ ciency: How Accurate are Decisions?
As noted in the Introduction, we distinguish two di¤erent kinds of e¢ ciency, informational and
economic. First we consider the informational e¢ ciency of the simultaneous and sequential
voting games. Informational e¢ ciency is simply dened as decision accuracy, without
consideration for the deadweight loss of voting costs. What fraction of the time does the
committee make the right decision?
19
To answer this question and allow comparison with a benchmark, we construct two
indices of accuracy. The optimalvoting mechanism from the standpoint of informational
e¢ ciency is a full information mechanism, where all voters always vote their signal. For the
parameters of our experiment, the best the committee can do on average is to vote correctly
with ex ante probability 2732 = :84. Conditional on the actual signal draws, the best possible
decision accuracies are (:96; :75) depending on whether three or two of the committee
members signals agreed with each other, respectively. Using this as a benchmark, we compute
an empirical measure of decision accuracy (DA) for each treatment and each combination of
signals for both the predicted Nash equilibrium strategies and the actual strategies used in the
experiment. DA is the fraction of actual decisions that match the decision that would have
been made in the full information mechanism, given the committee membersactual signal
draws.15
Table 4 presents comparisons of informational e¢ ciency across treatments according to
whether voting is sequential or simultaneous, by computing the di¤erence in scores (DA).
In the Nash equilibrium, decision accuracy should depend on both costs and the voting
mechanism. When we hold the voting mechanism constant, we expect that an increase in cost
should decrease informational e¢ ciency except when three signals agree and voting is
sequential. Not surprisingly, we nd signicant support for this prediction in our comparisons,
which are omitted from the table. When voting costs are low, both sequential and
simultaneous voting should have almost the same informational e¢ ciency (a slight di¤erence is
predicted when we combine across all signal realizations because of di¤erences in signal
realizations in the treatments), but when voting costs are high, sequential voting should
provide more informational e¢ ciency. We test the 5 possible comparisons for all signal
congurations as well as cases broken down by the distribution of signals for 15 total
comparisons (the comparisons reported and not reported). Since the probability of false
signicance is higher when making such multiple comparisons, we used the nonparametric
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procedure described by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Dene q as the desired minimum
false discovery rate or FDR. If we rank the comparisons by their corresponding p-values where
1 denotes the smallest and 15 the greatest and the rank is denoted by i, Benjamini and
Hochberg show that rejection of only null hypotheses such that the p-value is less than
 
i
15

q
(which we label the qFDR value in Table 4) controls the FDR at q when the test statistics are
independent. Benjamini and Hochberg (2001) further show that rejection of only null
hypotheses such that the p-value is less than
 
i
15

qP
i
1
i
controls the FDR at q when the tests
have dependencies. We report results using both procedures in Table 4 (q = 0:05).
[Table 4 here]
We nd mixed results in our comparisons of sequential and simultaneous voting on
informational e¢ ciency. As expected, we nd that in the low cost case, there is no signicant
di¤erence between sequential and simultaneous informational e¢ ciency except when all three
signals agree and sequential voting is slightly more e¢ cient, although the result is only
signicant if we assume that the multiple tests are independent and the magnitude of the
di¤erence is very small (0.05). The e¤ect is due to greater than equilibrium abstention by low
cost voters in simultaneous voting. However, although we expect that in the high cost case
there will be a signicant di¤erence between sequential and simultaneous informational
e¢ ciency, we again nd only a signicant di¤erence when all three signals agree and only if we
assume that the multiple tests are independent. This reects the fact that high cost voters
vote more frequently than predicted in simultaneous voting. Our results suggest that
informational e¢ ciency is somewhat a¤ected by the predicted variables but is also a¤ected by
behavioral factors that lead voters to diverge from Nash equilibrium predictions and, as we
found above, is better explained by the quantal response model.
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Economic E¢ ciency
We use as a benchmark in evaluating economic e¢ ciency the total expected payo¤s received by
the groups. In order to compare the di¤erences in economic e¢ ciency between the sequential
and simultaneous voting mechanisms with their predicted di¤erences we calculated the
predicted net expected group payo¤s given the realized signals and expected Nash equilibrium
behavior. Note that these are calculated before the realization of the state A or B so that any
randomness in the state, conditional on signal draws, that might benet a particular
treatment, does not a¤ect our comparisons. Furthermore, we calculated the payo¤s received
using the frequency of signal realizations and before the realization of the state in the same
way. Finally, as with informational e¢ ciency, we calculated the e¢ ciency measure for the two
di¤erent signal congurations (3 agree and 2 agree). Similarly, we calculated the actual net
expected group payo¤s in the same fashion. Table 4 also presents the predicted di¤erences in
net expected benets and our statistical comparisons (again we only report comparisons of
voting mechanisms as the comparisons between low and high cost treatments are, although
highly signicant and in the predicted directions, not surprising). As with informational
di¤erences, we controlled for a false rejection rate of 0.05 under both the assumption that the
multiple test statistics are independent and that they are dependent.
In general, the Nash predicted di¤erences in economic e¢ ciency are supported by the
comparisons and we nd stronger di¤erences in economic e¢ ciency between the voting
mechanisms than for informational e¢ ciency. The Nash equilibrium predictions on the e¤ects
of voting mechanism on economic e¢ ciency are di¤erent from those with respect to
informational e¢ ciency. That is, when three signals agree, sequential voting is predicted to be
more economically e¢ cient than the simultaneous mechanism, greatly so when voting costs are
high. We nd signicant support for these predictions. But when only two signals agree,
simultaneous voting is predicted to be more economically e¢ cient when voting costs are low
and very little di¤erence in economic e¢ ciency by voting mechanism is predicted when voting
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costs are high in this situation. In our empirical analysis, we nd no signicant di¤erence by
voting mechanism when only two signals agree regardless of the cost of voting. Again, these
divergences from the Nash equilibrium prediction support the quantal response model of voter
behavior as voters vote more than predicted when voting costs are high and less than predicted
in the low cost case.
Summarizing, the two main ndings about e¢ ciency are:
1. Sequential voting is slightly more informationally and economically e¢ cient than
simultaneous voting for both high and low voting costs, but the di¤erence is only signicant
when all three signals agree and, in the case of informational e¢ ciency, if we assume that the
multiple tests are independent.
2. The most informationally e¢ cient outcomes are observed in the low cost sequential voting
game, and the least informationally e¢ cient in the high cost simultaneous game. The
di¤erence in e¢ ciency between the two is estimated to be 13 percentage points across all cases,
17 percentage points when all three signals agree, and 12 percentage points when only two
signals agree.
EQUITY AND VOTING ORDER
Later voters may have an unfair advantage over earlier voters since they abstain more, even in
the high cost treatment where early voters are theoretically predicted to abstain strategically.
As noted above, the inequity we address is inequity caused by the ability of voters to free
rideon the participation of other voters and not inequities caused because policy outcomes
may be more representative of the choices of those who participate. Is sequential voting
inequitable in this sense? Do later voters earn greater payo¤s? In Table 5 we compare the
expected mean payo¤s in sequential voting by voter position and treatment with the Nash
predicted di¤erences, again controlling for a false discovery rate (q = 0:05) and for both
independent tests and multiple dependencies. We nd that there are signicant di¤erences
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between voter payo¤s in the sequential voting games, second and third voters are signicantly
better o¤ rst voters in the low and high cost treatments and third voters make signicantly
more than second voters in the low cost treatment. Thus, we nd signicant evidence that
sequential voting procedures in this setting favor later voters. We also nd signicant
evidence that second and third voters make more on average than simultaneous voters in the
low cost treatment and in the high cost treatment when three signals agree. Thus, being later
in the voter order provides a greater expected payo¤ than in simultaneous voting.
[Table 5 here]
We also nd that some of the Nash predicted di¤erences in payo¤s are not supported in
the data largely because of the divergence from Nash behavior in abstention decisions. In the
high cost treatment, rst and second voters are predicted in the Nash equilibrium to make
signicantly more than simultaneous voters. However, because rst voters vote more than
predicted, there is no signicant di¤erence between these payo¤s. Furthermore, rst voters
actually made signicantly less than second and third voters, which is contrary to the Nash
prediction but consistent with the quantal response model.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many voting situations from school board meetings to referenda on the European Unions
Constitution to mass elections in the United States are not simultaneous. The choices made
by earlier voters are often known to those who vote later in the sequence. Despite popular
perception that sequence matters in these voting situations, there has been little theoretical or
empirical study of the e¤ect of sequence on voter information and the outcomes of voting. In
this paper we provide a theoretical and experimental examination of the two systems under
costly voting. Our theory suggests that when the cost of voting is low, early voters should
participate and later voters should only participate if their votes are pivotal, i.e. they should
strategically abstain when not pivotal. In contrast, our theory suggests that when the cost of
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voting is high, we are likely to observe strategic abstention by early voters as they passthe
decision on to later voters.
Our experiment allowed us to directly measure the e¤ect of sequence on voter choices,
including abstention, controlling for voter preferences and information, which is di¢ cult using
naturally occurring data. The results support the theoretical predictions in general. Not
surprisingly, in simultaneous voting abstention increases with voting costs. However, we found
that in simultaneous voting elections abstention is higher than predicted when costs are low
and lower than predicted when costs are high, conistent with QRE. We largely found support
for our comparative static predictions in sequential voting elections. There were two
surprising ndings: early voters abstain less than prediced when voting costs are high; late
voters abstain more than predicted when their votes could be pivotal in both the low and high
cost treatments.
We also considered the e¢ ciency of sequential versus simultaneous voting when voting
is costly. We found that although some predicted e¢ ciency di¤erences between treatments
were signicant, others were not, reecting the divergence from Nash equilibrium behavior in
individual voting decisions. We found evidence that sequential voting is somewhat more
e¢ cient informationally and economically than simultaneous voting. The evidence was
strongest when all voters received the same signal and weakest when voters received di¤erent
signals. Finally, we evaluated the equity of sequential voting. As predicted, there are
signicant advantages to later voters in sequential voting in the low cost treatment, but these
gains are at the expense of early voters. Although in the high cost sequential treatment earlier
voters are predicted to benet, we found evidence of the opposite e¤ect; later voters make
signicantly more. Furthermore, we found that second and third voters make signicantly
more than voters in the simultaneous game in the low cost treatment, but no signicant
di¤erence in the high cost treatment.
Our results thus yield mixed conclusions about the benets of sequential over
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simultaneous voting, depending on how one weighs e¢ ciency versus equity. There is some
evidence that sequential voting is both informationally and economically more e¢ cient, but
nonequilibrium behavior of the voters makes these di¤erences weaker than theoretically
predicted and the di¤erences are strongest when votersinformation is equivalent. In
sequential voting there are signicant advantages to voters who are later in the voting order
because they have the option of strategically abstaining after observing the earlier voters.
APPENDIX: Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the rst case in which  2 [2p(1  p); 1]. We proceed in three steps:
Step 1. Consider rst voter 3 and assume, without loss of generality, that he has observed
signal a. Only three cases are possible. If no other voter has voted, or if the number of voters
who voted A is equal to the number of voters who voted for B, then his posterior probability
that the state is A would be p. The net benet of voting in this case is (1  ) 12(2p  1) > 0:
so he would vote informatively. The second case is when A has received exactly one vote more
than the other (histories A and A). In this case, the posterior belief that the state is A is
larger than p, and he would like A to win; however he does not need to vote to obtain this
outcome, so he abstains. If, on the contrary, B has received one vote more than A from
previous voters, then we have two distinct cases. In history B, he believes that A and B
have received the same number of signals. In this case, his posterior that the state is 12 : the
voter is indi¤erent between the options and would not vote (given that voting is costly). After
history B, he believes that B has received two votes, so he prefers alternative B and he
abstains. Finally, it is possible that one alternative has received more than one vote more that
the other: in this case voter n abstains because he would not a¤ect the outcome.
Step 2. Consider now voter 2. We can distinguish two di¤erent cases. Assume rst that
voter 1 has not voted before. If voter 2 votes, then, by step 1, he knows that voter 3 would
abstain: his expected utility would be (1  ) 12(2p  1)v. If he abstains, then voter 3 would
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vote informatively, and his expected utility would be 12(2p  1)v: so he nds it optimal to
abstain. Assume now that voter 1 has voted A. If voter 2 has observed signal a, then he
would nd it strictly optimal to abstain: in this case by voting A would not a¤ect the outcome
and by voting for B he would reduce the expected payo¤. Assume that voter 2 has observed
signal b. If he does not vote, then 3 would not vote as well and A would win: his expected
utility would be 12v (his posterior is 1/2 in this case). Clearly voting for A is suboptimal, so
consider the other alternative in which he votes for B. In this case, by step 1, voter 3 would
vote informatively and decide the outcome of the election; and the net expected payo¤ would
be pv   c. The net benet of voting is therefore (1  ) 12(2p  1)v > 0, so voter 2 nds it
optimal to vote informatively for B.
Step 3. Finally consider voter 1. If he abstains, then voter 2 would abstain. Voter 3 would
vote informatively and determine the election: in this case the expected payo¤ would be pv. If
he votes informatively, then he obtains:
p [p+ (1  p)p] v + (1  p) p2v  c
The net benet of voting is therefore:h
p(1  p)  
2
i
(2p  1)v
If  > 2p(1  p), voter 1 abstains and the election is decided by the last voter.
Consider now the second case in which  2 [0; 2p(1  p)] : Assume that 2 and 3 follow
exactly the same strategies as in i), but 1 voters informatively. From steps 1-3, this strategy is
and equilibrium when   2p(1  p). The result stated in Proposition 1 follows immediately
remembering that  = c [(2p  1) v] 1. 
NOTES
1. In particular v  Pr (A jPIVi; si = a)  12 is the net benet of voting. Assume that if the
agent does not vote then there is a tie. If the agent votes he obtains v with probability
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Pr (A jPIVi; si = a) (i.e., the posterior that the state is A given the fact that he is pivotal and
he has observed an a signal), and if he does not vote there is a tie and the policy is correct
with probability 12 . As it can be easily veried, the case in which if the agent does not vote
alternative B wins and if he votes A there is a tie is equivalent.
2. Indeed, exploiting this fact Ali and Kartik (2006) have constructed history dependent
equilibria in which voters learn from the behavior of previous voters. See also Fey (1998).
3. Using a di¤erent approach, Gerardi and Yariv (2005) show that a very wide class of voting
procedures, including both sequential and simultaneous methods, yield the same set of
equilibrium outcomes if voting is preceded by a deliberation stage where the voters can
communicate costlessly with each other. This neutrality result does not hold if either
deliberation OR voting is costly.
4. Callander (2004) suggests that the di¤erences between simultaneous and sequential
elections can be explained with behavioral assumptions on voters. He assumes that voters
prefer to vote for winners, so their decision would depend on the voting history. Such a voter
would vote for a winning candidate even if he or she is not pivotal.
5. These studies examine the abstention or position avoidance by members of Congress over a
number of bills. Cohen and Noll (1991) present a case study of Congressional abstention on a
series of bills on a single issue and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) analyze aggregate abstention
rates as a function of overall legislative ideological preferences.
6. Clearly the second requirement is not implied by the rst only out of equilibrium.
7. It is worth pointing out that non-neutral equilibria exist for some voting costs, but we see
no evidence of this kind of behavior in our experiment. Reaching such an equilibrium would
require some form of pre-play coordination, so that it is common knowledge among all three
voters that an abstention by the rst voter implies an a signal. Battaglini, et al. (2005)
explicitly construct an example of a non-neutral perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
8. Battaglini, et al. (2005) show with an example that insincere equilibria may exist.
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9. O¤ the equilibrium path behavior is more complicated and we present our predictions for
these situations in the context of our experiments in Table 3.
10. Each session included one additional subject who was paid $20 to serve as a monitor.
11. The computer program used was similar to Guarnaschelli, et al. (2000) for jury decision
making experiments without abstention, rewritten as an extension to the open source
Multistage game software. See http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu. The extension was developed
by Christopher Crabbe at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS).
12. We also estimated a multinomial probit to determine if there were learning e¤ects where
we nd signicant evidence that voters increase the probability of abstaining in the high cost
treatment but little evidence of learning in the low cost case. We performed similar
estimations for voters in the sequential treatments and found limited evidence of learning.
13. The constrained  lies between the two and is not shown on the gures.
14. See, for example, Camerer, Palfrey, and Rogers (2006). How to endogenize , and to
characterize how it varies across games are interesting and challenging open theoretical
questions.
15. The choice of a benchmark does not a¤ect our results. Other benchmarks yield similar
conclusions.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Session First 20 rounds Second 20 rounds #Subjects
1 High Cost Simultaneous Low Cost Sequential 9
2 Low Cost Simultaneous High Cost Sequential 12
3 Low Cost Sequential High Cost Simultaneous 12
4 High Cost Sequential Low Cost Simultaneous 12
5 High Cost Sequential Low Cost Sequential 12
6 Low Cost Sequential High Cost Sequential 12
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Table 2: Voter Choices in Simultaneous Voting Games
Low Cost High Cost
Data Nash QRE1 QRE2 Data Nash QRE1 QRE2
Abstained 0.39 0 0.39 0.42 0.68 0.89 0.68 0.70
Voted Signal 0.58 1 0.61 0.58 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.30
Voted Contrary 0.029 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0
 0.49 0.30 0.25 0.30
Log Likelihood 320.91 586.1 263.74 586.1
Total Obs. 480 420
QRE1 = unconstrained  across cost treatments, QRE2 = constrained 
Constrained model not rejected (p = :05)
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Table 3: Abstention Rates in the Sequential game
Voter History* Low Cost High Cost
Data Nash QRE # Obs Data Nash QRE # Obs
1 :33 0 :46 300 :45 1 :63 320
2 A :39 1 :51 100 :50 1 :61 144
2 S :71 1 :55 129 :84 1 :70 108
2 D :41 0 :29 71 :68 0 :68 68
3 A,A :32 0 :19 39 :33 0 :44 72
3 A, S :80 1 :59 60 :79 1 :72 72
3 A, D :63 1 :59 27 :63 1 :72 35
3 S, A :99 1 :59 79 :93 1 :72 82
3 D, A :69 1 :72 42 :71 1 :74 55
3 S,S 1:00 1 :59 23 :88 1 :72 8
3 D,D :92 1 :59 13 1:00 1 :72 7
3 S,D :22 0 :19 18 :33 0 :44 15
3 D,S :32 0 :19 25 :56 0 :44 9
All Periods Periods 11-20 All Periods Periods 11-20
Lambda 0:19 0:16 0:13 0:16
Log Likelihood  582:41  291:73  593:15  286:90
Pooled Estimation All Periods Periods 11-20
Constrained Lambda 0:15 0:16
Const. Log Likelihood  1178:00  578:63
*Examples of History Notation
A Abstained
S First voter voted same as second voters signal
D First voter voted di¤erently from second voters signal
A, S First voter abstained, second voter voted third voters signal
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Table 4: Statistical Comparisons of E¢ ciency
Informational E¢ ciency Comparisons of DA
Cases Comparison Nash Data p qFDR
All Cases Low Seq. > Low Sim. .003 .05 0.05 0.034
High Seq. > High Sim. .16 .05 0.08 0.04
3 Sigs. Agree Low Seq. > Low Sim. 0 .05* 0.02 0.03
High Seq. > High Sim. .32 .09* 0.01 0.03
2 Sigs. Agree Low Seq. > Low Sim. 0 .05 0.14 0.05
High Seq. > High Sim. .04 .02 0.31 0.05
Economic E¢ ciency Comparisons of Net Exp. Ben.Di¤erences
All Cases Low Seq. > Low Sim. -2.35 5.76* 0.02 0.04
High Seq. > High Sim. 18.24 3.43 0.12 0.05
3 Sigs. Agree Low Seq. > Low Sim. 4 6.79** 0.01 0.03
High Seq. > High Sim. 43.28 9.63** 0.01 0.04
2 Sigs. Agree Low Seq. > Low Sim. -7.33 4.37 0.09 0.04
High Seq. > High Sim. 0.15 -0.46 0.55 0.05
* p  qFDR, reject null hypothesis of no di¤erence (assuming indep. tests)
** signicant for multiple dependencies across tests
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Table 5: Statistical Comparisons of Equity
Dierence
Cost Cases Comparison Nash Actual p qFDR
Low All Voter 1 > Voter 2 -1.6 -0.4** 0 0.001
Voter 1 > Voter 3 -2 -0.77** 0 0.001
Voter 1 > Simul. 0.16 1.54 0.04 0.03
Voter 2 > Voter 3 0 -0.37** 0 0.001
Voter 2 > Simul. 1.76 1.94* 0.02 0.03
Voter 3 > Simul. 1.76 2.31** 0.01 0.02
3 Sigs Agree Voter 1 > Voter 2 -2 -0.64** 0 0.001
Voter 1 > Voter 3 -2 -1.21** 0 0.001
Voter 1 > Simul. 0 1.65 0.032 0.031
Voter 2 > Voter 3 0 -0.57** 0 0.001
Voter 2 > Simul. 2 2.29** 0.01 0.02
Voter 3 > Simul. 2 2.86** 0.001 0.02
2 Sigs Agree Voter 1 > Voter 2 -1.33 -0.24* 0.0137 0.014
Voter 1 > Voter 3 -2 -0.48** 0 0.001
Voter 1 > Simul. 0 1.22 0.13 0.04
Voter 2 > Voter 3 0 0.23* 0.01 0.02
Voter 2 > Simul. 1.33 1.46 0.09 0.04
Voter 3 > Simul. 1.33 1.69 0.06 0.04
High All Voter 1 > Voter 2 0 -1.63** 0 0.01
Voter 1 > Voter 3 8 -1.9** 0 0.01
Voter 1 > Simul. 13.54 -0.03 0.49 0.05
Voter 2 > Voter 3 8 -0.28 0.19 0.04
Voter 2 > Simul. 13.54 1.59 0.06 0.03
Voter 3 > Simul. 5.54 1.87 0.033 0.032
3 Sigs Agree Voter 1 > Voter 2 0 -2.24** 0 0.01
Voter 1 > Voter 3 8 -2.41** 0 0.01
Voter 1 > Simul. 17.09 1.66 0.11 0.04
Voter 2 > Voter 3 8 -0.18 0.35 0.05
Voter 2 > Simul. 17.09 3.9** 0.003 0.02
Voter 3 > Simul. 9.09 4.07** 0.002 0.02
2 Sigs Agree Voter 1 > Voter 2 0 -1.17* 0.007 0.02
Voter 1 > Voter 3 8 -1.52** 0.0003 0.02
Voter 1 > Simul. 11.05 -1.05 0.2 0.04
Voter 2 > Voter 3 8 -0.35 0.2 0.04
Voter 2 > Simul. 11.05 0.12 0.5 0.05
Voter 3 > Simul. 3.05 0.47 0.35 0.05
* p  qFDR, reject null hypothesis of no di¤erence (assuming indep. tests)
** signicant for multiple dependencies across tests
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Figure 1:  Simultaneous Voters' QRE Abstention Probabilities
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Figure 2a:  First Voter's QRE Abstention Probabilities
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
Second Voter's Probability of Abstaining
λ
H
is
to
ry
 S
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
λ
H
is
to
ry
 D
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
λ
H
is
to
ry
 A
High cost Low cost 
High cost λ 
Low cost λ 
Actual data in high cost treatment
Actual data in low cost treatment
Figure 2b:  Second Voter's QRE Abstention Probabilities 
 
History S = first voter voted same as second voter's signal; 
D = first voter voted differently from second voter's signal; 
A= first voter abstained.
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Figure 2c:  Third Voter's QRE Abstention Probabilities 
 
History S, D refers to case where first voter voted same 
as third voter's signal and second voter voted differently 
from third voter's signal; other cases similarly 
interpreted;  A = abstention
